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Recent Latin American 
experience 
Victor E. Tokman 
This article takes as its working hypothesis the pos-
tulation that while the international recession makes it 
necessary to effect internal adjustments involving a 
lower level of activity, there are various alternative 
ways of tackling the situation, these options being 
partly determined by the structural characteristics of 
the economy, but also depending on the set of poli-
cies applied. In order to corroborate the hypothesis, 
the adjustment policies followed by various Latin 
American countries in the last two crises are analysed, 
and it is concluded from this that if we leave out the 
group of countries which are so small and open that 
they have little autonomy in facing the crisis, the 
economic history of the last five years shows the fail-
ure both of the global monetary policies followed in 
the Southern Cone and of the expansive policies of 
the oil-exporting countries. The more eclectic models 
applied by other countries, although markedly differ-
ent from each other, appear to have been most effec-
tive in reducing or at least postponing the cost of the 
adjustment and sharing it out more equitably. 
Two specific aspects are also analysed: the re-
percussions of the increase in interest rates on the 
Latin American economies, and the adjustment of the 
labour market, which takes different forms from one 
country to another. In some countries, this adjust-
ment takes place through an increase in open un-
employment; in others, through an increase in under-
employment, and in yet others, through a combina-
tion of both factors. The reasons why the adjustment 
takes these different forms are analysed, together 
with the implications of this fact. It is postulated that 
in fact the reduction in the income of those working in 
own-account occupations plays the role of a collective 
unemployment insurance policy and constitutes in 
practice a second-best solution from a welfare point 
of view. 
Director, Regional Employment Programme for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (PREALC). 
I 
Introduction 
Latin America and the Caribbean, like the rest 
of the world, have gone through several inter-
national crises during the last decade which have 
made it necessary to introduce adjustment poli-
cies in the economy. Adjustment is of course in-
evitable, since it is necessary that the national 
economies adapt themselves to a reduced avail-
ability of real resources. Nevertheless, there is 
more than one possible adjustment policy and, 
given this diversity as well as the varying modes 
of application, different results may be pro-
duced. 
In the first place, as regards the period re-
quired to produce results, there is a difference 
between policies that affect the level of expendi-
ture and policies that operate through changes 
in relative prices as the principal mechanism for 
shifting resources from the production of goods 
for domestic utilization to the production of 
tradeables. Generally speaking, the trend in the 
reduction of domestic expenditure should be to 
concentrate on lowering consumption rather 
than investment, so as to avoid eventual adverse 
effects upon economic growth. At the same 
time, however, adjustment to the international 
recession has coincided with inflation in most 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, mak-
ing it necessary to apply both adjustments simul-
taneously. The final result is that adjustment 
policies cease to be neutral and basically hit 
wages and employment levels. Wages suffer be-
cause they are usually regarded as the key vari-
able for stabilization of price levels, for fostering 
an improvement in international competitive-
ness, and for inducing a contraction in the level 
of consumption. Employment levels are af-
fected, for their part, because a lower level of 
domestic expenditure generates a higher level 
of open unemployment. 
The current world crisis, as well as that 
suffered at the beginning of the 1970s, is differ-
ent from other international fluctuations to 
which the economies of the region and the de-
veloping world have been historically subject, 
for the size and depth of these recent crises have 
affected not only developing countries but also 
those at the centre. In this connection, a com-
parison is increasingly being drawn between the 
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present recessive conjuncture and that experi-
enced in the 1930s. 
There are at least two important differ-
ences between the Great Depression of over half 
a century ago and the present recessive situa-
tion, however. In the first place, given the cru-
cial role currently played by the rise in oil prices, 
the question of whether a country produces it or 
not and exports it or not furnishes a first major 
differentiation between economies, irrespective 
of whether they are located in the north or in 
the south. In the region, this differentiation can 
be clearly perceived in the dissimilar perfor-
mance in the present crisis of the oil-exporting 
economies as compared with the rest of the con-
tinent. 
In the second place, in contrast with the 
1930s, the present international recession and 
the one before it have been accompanied with 
inflation in the developed world. This has at 
least two direct implications. On the one hand, 
the deterioration in the terms of trade of the 
non-oil-exporting countries of the region is at 
present greater than that observed in the 1930s. 
The terms of trade of the Latin American coun-
tries decreased at an annual rate of 6.7% be-
tween 1930 and 1933, whereas this deteriora-
tion attained an annual rate of 8.4% in the 
1974-1975 crisis and 9.6% from 1978 to 1981, 
in the non-oil-exporting group. Even so, in con-
trast with what happened in the 1930s the de-
cline in the purchasing power of the region's ex-
ports has been less severe, and even in the cur-
rent crisis the expansion of the export quantum 
has more than compensated for the fall in the 
terms of trade. 
On the other hand, the policies pursued in 
the central countries and especially in the 
United States during the present recession have 
involved a considerable rise in nominal interest 
rates, this occurring at a time when the foreign 
indebtedness of the countries of the Region has 
increased significantly. This rise exceeds the 
rate of growth of the export prices of the non-
oil-exporting Latin American countries, and 
amounted between 1978 and 1981 to an in-
crease of 47.5% in the prime rate and of 32.6% 
in the rate applicable to Eurodollars, both in 
real terms. 
The aim of this paper is to review the re-
lationships between the aforesaid variables, 
which summarize the effects of the international 
recession on the economy of the countries in the 
region, and the behaviour of wages and employ-
ment. T o this end, special attention will be paid 
to the periods 1973-1975 and from 1979 to the 
present. On the basis of this review, the differ-
ent reactions of various countries of the region 
to the international situation can be identified as 
well as the extent to which the latter has affected 
wages and employment. With this in view, and 
given the difficulties that would be involved in 
analysing all countries of the region, a broad 
typology of situations will be made and illus-
trated by an analysis of some particular cases. 
The discussion, moreover, will necessarily be re-
stricted, since a comprehensive analysis of the 
adjustment process, given its macroeconomic 
character, would take us beyond the limited 
objectives of this paper. 
We take as a working hypothesis the post-
ulation that, although the international reces-
sion necessarily entails adjustments that imply a 
relatively lower level of activity, there are vari-
ous alternative options for dealing with the situa-
tion, which in fact has already been experienced 
by the countries of the region. These options 
are in part determined by the structural fea-
tures of the individual economies, but they also 
depend on the policy package that is applied. In 
this context, wage policy comes to play an im-
portant part in short-run adjustments and in ef-
fect determines the distribution of the cost in-
volved in the adjustment among the different 
groups of the population. 
In addition, two other aspects will be dealt 
with.- The first is the impact of the rise in inter-
est rates on the Latin American economies, 
since as mentioned above, this is a new and dis-
tinguishing factor of the present crisis. The sec-
ond is the adjustment of the labour market, be-
cause of its implications on income levels and 
distribution. 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RECESSIONS I Victor E. Tokman 115 
II 
The external adjustment and wages 
1. The case of small open countries 
There is a first group of countries in the region 
which are of small size and have an openness 
coefficient (i.e., a ratio of exports to gross na-
tional product) of between 20 and 30%. They 
had these same structural features already in 
the 1930s, and when faced with the interna-
tional crisis at that time they had to remain tied 
to the gold standard while waiting for the auto-
matic adjustment to operate. On that occasion, 
they suffered a considerable cost as a result of 
not being able to design policies that would at-
tenuate the effect of the international crisis. The 
present situation seems to be basically the same. 
T h e full impact of world recessions falls upon 
these economies, which must inevitably absorb 
the deterioration in the terms of trade and re-
duce real wages whenever an international situ-
ation of this sort occurs. 
Central America and the Caribbean pro-
vide numerous examples of this type of econ-
omy, where the possibility of an autonomous 
policy is slight. In particular, if we examine the 
performance of Costa Rica and Honduras in the 
1973-1975 crisis and in the present one, since 
1979, we can see that in both countries the fall in 
the terms of trade has brought with it a decline 
in real wages. Thus, in Honduras the first reces-
sion implied a loss of around 6.3% in the growth 
rate of the product owing to the fall in the terms 
of trade and a reduction of 2.9% in industrial 
sector real wages during the same period. The 
present recession has meant up to 1981 a fall in 
the growth rate of the product of around 8.2% 
and an 8.1% drop in industrial real wages {see 
table 1). 
In Costa Rica there are similar links be-
tween the negative effect of the decline in the 
terms of trade and the decrease in real wages 
during the two international crises. In this coun-
try there has also been a further reduction in 
real wages stemming from an upsurge of infla-
tion in an economy that had not previously ex-
perienced high inflation rates. The 1973-1975 
recession there coincided with an inflation rate 
of 25%, while in the present crisis the annual in-
flation rate averaged 30% between 1979 and 
1981, the rate for the latter year being 65%. 
2. The case of medium-sized and large countries 
Already in the recession of the 1930s, and to an 
even greater extent in more recent international 
crises, the other countries of the region have dis-
played a certain degree of autonomy which has 
enabled them to a certain extent to reduce and 
control the impact of international crises of this 
magnitude. This group of countries comprises 
those of a larger size, generally less open to in-
ternational trade and with a higher degree of 
urbanization and modernization. Hence, ex-
ports hardly exceed 10% of the product, the 
proportion of modern urban activities in em-
ployment reaches between 50 and 60% of the 
total labour force, and employment in modern 
industry comprises between 20 and 28% of the 
non-agricultural labour force. It is precisely in 
this group of countries that wages come to be a 
representantive variable, given the greater 
coverage of wage-labour as a direct result of the 
higher degree of modernization. Included in this 
group are the Southern Cone countries (Argen-
tina, Chile and Uruguay), Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela, among others. 
By way of introduction, it is worth review-
ing the performance of these countries in the 
crisis of the 1930s and the policies they ap-
plied.1 In the first place, those Latin American 
countries that enjoyed some degree of auto-
nomy went through this crisis at a lower cost 
than the other countries of the region and even 
than the United States and Canada, In general, 
they grew more rapidly than the latter two 
countries in the period following the crisis 
(1932-1939); they recovered sooner; their con-
traction was not so pronounced as in Northern 
'The analysis of the performance of these countries 
and the policies followed during the 1930s crisis closely fol-
lows the work of C. Diaz-Alejandro: Latin America in the 
1930s (New Haven, Yale University Economic Growth 
Center, 1981). 
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Table 1 
EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT, WAGES AND PRICES IN SOME 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Terms of 
trade 
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Source: Prepared by PREALC on the basis of national data. 
a
 Changes between the initial and final year of each period, 
b
 Relation between exports and gross domestic product. 
c
 Obtained by multiplying the change in the terms of trade by Use coefficient of openness. 
d
 Annual cumulative rates referring to changes December to December. 
America; and manufacturing industry, which 
became the leading sector in these economies, 
grew steadily at an annual rate of between 8 and 
13%, whereas in the United States the manufac-
turing sector remained stagnant. 
The policies pursued by this group of 
countries during the 1930s were characteristic-
ally heterodox, in defiance of the conventional 
prescriptions of monetarist experts of the time 
('money doctors', as Carlos Diaz-Alejandro calls 
them). Concerning the balance of payments, 
there were currency devaluations and multiple 
exchange rate systems were established, with a 
higher rate for imports, a medium rate for ex-
ports and a preferential rate for servicing the ex-
ternal debt. Likewise, most of these countries re-
negotiated their debt unilaterally, only Argen-
tina, Haiti and the Dominican Republic continu-
ing to service the debt on its original terms. The 
effect of devaluation was not inflationary and 
helped to increase competitiveness through a 
change in the relation between the exchange 
rate and wages, basically through an increase in 
the former since the latter remained stable in 
real terms. These measures were accompanied 
by exchange controls and tariff adjustments that 
raised the level of protection. 
The monetary and fiscal policies applied at 
that time had a clear expansionary effect. The 
real money supply increased, basically owing to 
the decline in nominal prices, and the stock of 
money was increased against bonds, indepen-
dently of the gold standard that had been in 
force up to that time. In several countries, a 
moratorium on the internal debt was declared 
and financial institutions were supported to pre-
vent bankruptcy by means of diverse measures 
ranging from special rediscount lines to, in 
some cases, the freezing of savings deposits. Fis-
cal policy acquired distinct anticyclical features: 
there was no attempt to balance the budget, and 
a deficit was maintained, basically financed by 
delays in payments and an increase in short-
term borrowing. Likewise, public expenditure 
was increased in order to avoid a contraction of 
economic activity. 
Finally, the combined effect of these mea-
sures was to produce a far-reaching structural 
transformation which still characterizes the 
economies of these countries up to the present 
and basically consisted of a rapid expansion of 
the manufacturing sector, together with a 
higher degree of State intervention in economic 
activity. 
At present, the countries in this group 
have begun to develop differences owing chiefly 
to the different impact of oil prices in the more 
recent international crises. Hence, a distinction 
must be made between the oil-exporting coun-
tries, those which are largely dependent on im-
ported fuel, and those which have some degree 
of autonomy because they are relatively self-suf-
ficient. Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela are 
among the oil-exporting countries, while Brazil 
is particularly heavily dependent on fuel im-
ports. Finally, in the group of relatively self-suf-
ficient countries a distinction must be made be-
tween those which in the past decade have ap-
plied structural policies of price stabilization and 
external openness (basically, those of the South-
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ern Cone) and those which have pursued more 
conventional policies, such as Colombia. 
3. The oil-exporting countries 
These countries benefited from the rise in the 
price of oil, which caused a remarkable im-
provement in their terms of trade, combined in . 
some cases, such as that of Mexico, with a con-
siderable expansion in the export volume of this 
product. The improvement was particularly 
marked in the case of Ecuador, Mexico and 
Venezuela, which were able to apply a policy of 
real wage increases owing to the favourable in-
ternational situation, so that a high correlation 
between the rise in the terms of trade and in-
creases in real wages is observed {see table 1). 
However, there was a growing tendency in 
these countries to overexpand domestic expen-
diture and to increase the money supply as a re-
sult of the aforesaid oil boom, resulting in accel-
erated inflation and/or balance-of-payments 
problems. These were paradoxical results, since 
these economies had historically exhibited low 
rates of inflation, while moreover their greatest 
boom in recent decades was followed by the 
emergence of a balance-of-payments deficit. 
They were thus compelled to resort to adjust-
ment policies involving a reduction of expendi-
ture and wage controls, as in Mexico and Ve-
nezuela since 1979. As a result, real wages 
tended to contract despite the improvement in 
the terms of trade. 
Ultimately, although during the period 
1973-1981 wages benefited from the oil boom, 
the actual benefits were diminished owing to the 
aforesaid internal disëquilibria, especially infla-
tion, whose effects were particularly negative 
because these economies had little previous ex-
perience of this problem and hence lacked sys-
tems of wage indexation. Thus, in Venezuela, 
despite an expansion of the order of 28% in the 
product due to improvements in the terms of 
trade, real wages in the industrial sector in-
creased by only 14% during the same period. 
4. The non-oil-exporting countries 
a) Countries dependent on oil imports 
By far the most important country in this 
group is Brazil, which is relatively autonomous 
in the design of its economic policy but is heavily 
dependent on oil imports. This country made 
active use of its possibilities of increasing the ex-
ternal debt in order to cushion the economy 
from the recessive impact caused by the pro-
nounced fall in its terms of trade. 
As a result of these policies, during the 
period 1973-1975 Brazil was able to raise indus-
trial real wages by around 12%, even though the 
terms of trade fell by approximately 21%. With 
the further fall in its terms of trade from 1978 
onwards, however, the growth in real wages has 
considerably slackened (see table 1). 
It is clear that Brazil gradually lost flexibil-
ity in its handling of international crises both 
through the emergence of internal imbalances 
chiefly observable in the inflationary upsurge of 
recent years and through the greater cost as-
sociated with the increase in real interest rates, 
given its high degree of indebtedness. Thus, if 
the growth in the nominal interest rate applied 
by commercial banks to their best customers 
{prime rate) and in that applied to three-month 
deposits in Eurodollars is compared with the 
growth in the price of Brazilian exports, it will 
be seen that the former rose during 1978-1981 
by 59% and the latter by only 43% {both in real 
terms). Given that 84% of Brazil's external debt 
has been contracted at variable interest rates 
and that it constitutes around 25% of the gross 
national product, and taking into account that 
the rate prevailing in 1978 was around 10%, it 
can be estimated that the rise in international in-
terest rates has produced a deterioration of 
around 11% in the product, which is almost 
four times the deterioration in the product at-
tributable to the fall in the terms of trade during 
the period 1978-1981. 
Nevertheless, despite the unfavourable 
situation confronted by Brazil, analysis of the 
period 1973-1981 shows that, although this 
country had to face a deterioration in the terms 
of trade that implied a decrease in the rate of 
growth of the product of around 3.5%, the 
domestic policies applied not only protected 
wages from a similar reduction but actually per-
mitted a rise of around 37% in the average real 
wage paid in the industrial sector- This is un-
doubtedly a clear illustration of policies capable 
of coping with the international recession with-
out shifting the burden of the adjustment 
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primarily on to wages. It is still too early, how-
ever, to evaluate the net effect, since this coun-
try must face up to a heavy external debt which 
was, in fact, one of the factors that made possi-
ble the economic policy approach adopted. 
b) Countries not dependent on oil 
i) Countries without substantial changes in 
economic policy. A case that illustrates this type of 
situation is Colombia. Its terms of trade were 
adversely affected both in the 1973-1975 crisis 
and in that beginning in 1978. Notwithstanding 
the negative impact of the international situa-
tion, the economic policies adopted fostered an 
expansion in the quantum of exports and thus 
neutralized the adverse effect of international 
prices, at the same time permitting a significant 
rise in real wages during the period 1973-1981. 
Thus, in contrast with a potential decline in the 
product of around 1%, attributable to the de-
cline in the terms of trade, urban minimum 
wages rose by 50%, industrial wages by 12% and 
those in construction by 33% (all in real terms) 
over the same period (see table 1). 
ii) Countries with marked changes in economic 
policy. This group includes Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay,2 which during the decade pursued 
policies of price stabilization and external open-
ness of their economies. It is outside the objec-
tives of this paper to comment here on these 
policies or on their main effects.3 We shall con-
centrate instead on the degree of autonomy of 
these countries regarding the taking of domestic 
economic policy decisions and on the conse-
quences of the policies adopted. 
First, the fact that these countries possess 
some degree of autonomy in their economic-
policy decisions and are not entirely subject to 
international fluctuations is clearly illustrated by 
the case of Argentina, which during the 1973-
1975 crisis succeeded in at least maintaining 
wages in real terms, despite a deterioration in its 
2It should be noted that the three countries have dif-
ferent degrees of dependence on imported oil. Argentina is 
practically self-sufficient, while Uruguay is highly depen-
dent. Chile's position is intermediate. 
3See, for example, PRE ALC : Políticas de estabilización y 
empleo en América Latina, Investigaciones Sobre Empleo 
Series, No. 22 (Santiago, PREALC, 1982). 
terms of trade of around 30%. Similarly, Chile 
in the recession beginning in 1978 succeeded in 
preventing the deterioration in the terms of 
trade from being transferred to wages. It should 
be noted in this latter case that the increase in 
real wages during the more recent period was 
largely due to the slowdown in the inflation rate, 
which in an indexed economy automatically 
amounts to a rise in real wages. 
Secondly, wages became a basic variable in 
the economic and social policies adopted by 
these countries. Wage control was a basic policy 
instrument in the effort to achieve price stabili-
zation and an improvement in international 
competitiveness,^ especially during the quite 
long periods when fixed exchange rate policies 
were applied (or, more generally, overvaluation 
of the local currency), when it was sought to 
achieve, by reducing wages, a shift of resources 
towards the production of tradeables. Wage 
control was also used as a social objective for dis-
ciplining the labour force, since in both coun-
tries it was sought by this means to avoid pres-
sures that might challenge the economic and 
political decisions being applied. In particular; 
this economic strategy resulted in a disarticula-
tion of the trade-union movement, basically 
through the anti-industrial and anti-employ-
ment bias introduced by the policy.4 This made 
possible effective reductions in real wages with-
out major resistance arising within the system. 
The result of these policies was a reduction 
in wages that apparently exceeded the cost that 
would have been involved in absorbing the de-
terioration of the terms of trade. Thus, in 
Argentina between 1973 and 1981 the decline 
in the terms of trade implied a reduction) in the 
growth rate of the product of around 3.6%, but 
wages in the industrial sector fell during that 
period by around 21%. In Chile between 1970 
and 1975, the negative effect of the terms of 
trade implied a fall in the product of around 
7%, but industrial wages contracted during that 
period by over 41 % (see table 1). 
In both countries, however, real industrial 
wages rose between 1978 and 1981 in spite of a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. This wage 
4R. Lagos and V.E. Tokman: Global monetarism, em-
ployment and social stratification, Trabajos Ocasionales Series, 
No. 47, Rev.l (Santiago, PREALC, 1982). 
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behaviour conceals the real effect of the policies 
followed, for various reasons. The first is that 
1981 was a year in which wages were at their 
maximum, but only temporarily, since real in-
dustrial wages fell during 1982 by 10.5 and 3% 
in Argentina and Chile, respectively. The sec-
ond reason is that the adjustment operated 
mainly through reductions in the levels of total 
employment, especially that in manufacturing 
industry, rather than through reductions in 
wages. Manufacturing employment in Argen-
tina fell in absolute terms between 1973 and 
1981 by 32.8% (37.2%, if 1982 is included) and 
by 21.2% between 1978 and 1981 (26.2%, if 
1982 is included). In Chile, the reduction be-
tween 1970 and 1981 was around 17% (28%, if 
1982 is included) and 8% between 1978 and 
1981 (20.4%, if 1982 is included). Lastly, in the 
particular case of Chile, the adjustment implied 
a substantial increase in the rate of open un-
employment and in occupations in emergency 
programmes at remunerations of around one-
third of the minimum wage. Open unemploy-
ment, including this minimum employment, in-
creased Fivefold between 1970 and 1981 and 
reached 28.4% of the labour force in 1982. 
5. Tentative conclusions 
To sum up, the experience of different coun-
tries in the region suggests that, although in the 
face of adverse international developments the 
countries have no option other than to adjust 
their economies, and that this implies adopting 
policies that result in a fall in real wages, this oc-
curs automatically only in a small group of 
countries which, because of their size and de-
The present world recession differs from earlier 
ones in that it has not only produced a major fall 
in the region's terms of trade but also been ac-
companied by a rise in the interest rate applica-
ble to the external debt service. Thus, between 
1978 and 1981 the rate applicable to best debt-
gree of openness, do not possess the autonomy 
to alter this result. 
There are, however, numerous countries 
in the region that have in the past shown a cer-
tain degree of autonomy and have controlled 
the domestic adjustment to international reces-
sions by influencing the distribution of the cost 
of adjustment, the period during which it is ap-
plied and, finally, the different mechanisms 
through which their economies adjust to exter-
nal crises. Experience also shows that some 
countries have succeeded in applying an expan-
sive wage policy during adverse international 
conditions, just as there are others which, in 
similar circumstances, have accentuated the cost 
of adjustment by introducing substantial 
changes in their economic policies. Finally, the 
oil-exporting countries are a special case in 
which, although it is possible in principle {and so 
it has been done) to pass on the international 
bonanza in the form of real wage increases, in-
ternal and sometimes external imbalances arise 
that eventually limit this possibility, so that fi-
nally wages actually expand less than would 
have been theoretically feasible. 
In short, the economic history of the last 
five years points to the failure of two kinds of 
policies: the contractionary global monetarist 
policy followed in the Southern Cone, and the 
expansive policy of the oil-exporting countries. 
The more eclectic models followed by other 
countries, although markedly different from 
each other, seem to have been more effective in 
reducing or at least postponing, the cost of the 
adjustment and distributing it in a more equita-
ble manner. 
ors by North American banks {prime rate) 
rose by 72.3% and the rate applicable to three-
month deposits in Eurodollars rose by 54.9%. 
This considerable increase in nominal in-
terest rates entails an additional outflow of fi-
nancial resources for the countries of the re-
III 
The increase in international interest rates 
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T a b l e 2 
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Snurif: Prepared by PRE A 1,(1 on the basis of information from the countries. 
i | = variation in the interest rate on Eurodollar deposits for 90 days. 
ia = variation in the prime interest rate. 
P„ = changes in export prices. 
PL = changes in domestic prices. 
tt = changes in the exchange rate. 
a
 Refers to 1980. 
b
 Refers to the average for the period 1978-1980. 
1
 Calculated by applying the mean variation in the real interest rate ( 1 ) and (2) to the percentage of the debt with respect to the product (5), 
adjusted by the percentage of the debt subject to variable interest rates. 
d
 Relation between (7) and the loss due to the terms of trade as estimated in table 1. 
gion. It has been estimated that in 1981 each ad-
ditional percentage point on the nominal inter-
est rate implied an increase in interest payments 
of US$ 2 250 million for the region as a whole. 
This amount is equivalent to 2.6% of the value 
of Latin America's exports of goods, reaching a 
proportion of 3.3% of total annual export value 
in the case of Mexico and around 3% in that of 
Argentina and Brazil. 
T o assess the pressure on resources im-
plied by this increase in the nominal interest 
rate, it must be compared with the evolution of 
export prices in the region during the same 
period. When this is done, the situation becomes 
more diversified, according to the particular 
features of each country. In the case of the re-
gion's oil-exporting economies, their export 
prices grew faster than the increase in the nomi-
nal interest rate during the period, and the vari-
ation in the real interest rate has consequently 
been negative. In the remaining countries of the 
region, the effect of the change in the real inter-
est rate has affected growth of the product dif-
ferently according to the evolution of export 
prices, the ratio of the external debt to the gross 
national product, and the proportion of the 
debt contracted at variable interest rates. 
Firstly, there is a group of countries where 
the rise in nominal interest rates was combined 
with a fall in export prices, at the same time that 
the external debt amounted to a high per-
centage of the gross national product. This is 
typically the case of the Central American 
economies, among them Costa Rica and Hon-
duras. As a result of the rise in real interest 
rates5 the growth possibilities diminished by 
20% in Costa Rica and by 16% in Honduras 
during the period 1978-1981 (see table 2). Sec-
ondly, there is another group of countries 
where the rise in nominal interest rates was 
5 The method used to calculate this effect consisted of 
estimating the proportion of the debt subject to variable in-
terest rates in relation to the gross domestic product and ap-
plying to this coefficient the rate of growth of the interest 
rate in real terms, defined as the variation in the interna-
tional interest rate, deflated by the variation in the export 
prices of the respective country. 
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combined with virtually stationary export prices 
and the burden of the external debt as a propor-
tion of the national product is around 25% but 
it is largely contracted at variable interest rates. 
This group includes Brazil and Colombia, 
where the effect of the potential loss of growth 
of the product was around 10% during the same 
period. Finally, we have a group of countries in 
which the increase in nominal interest rates was 
largely offset by an improvement in export 
prices, but which nevertheless exhibit a heavy 
burden of external debt as a percentage of the 
national product (of the order of 40%), with 
around 80% of the debt contracted at variable 
interest rates. This is the case of Argentina and 
Chile, with a potential loss of growth of the 
product of 4% in the former and 7% in the lat-
ter. 
On the other hand, to gain an approxi-
mate idea of the effect of the rise in real interest 
rates as compared with that attributable to the 
deterioration of the terms of trade, it is conve-
nient to relate both effects to the potential 
growth of the national product. This shows that 
during the period 1978-1981 the size of the ef-
fect associated with real interest rates varied 
among different countries from 1.9 to 5.6 times 
the terms-of-trade effect. At one extreme we 
find Argentina and Colombia, where the real in-
terest-rate effect is around five times that linked 
with the terms of trade. They are followed by an 
intermediate group including Brazil and Costa 
Rica, where the effect of the former is around 
three times that of the latter, and a third group, 
made up of countries like Chile and Honduras, 
where the difference is around two to one (see 
table 2). 
Lastly, it should be noted that the most sig-
nificant change in the structure of the region's 
external debt in recent years has been the in-
crease in the proportion of private funds in the 
total, both as regards their origin and their des-
tination. There has been a particularly sharp in-
crease in the proportion of private sector credits 
without public sector guarantee. This has 
brought about a change in the characteristics of 
the external indebtedness, which is increasingly 
contracted at variable interest rates (85% of the 
total by 1981), thereby making the economies 
more vulnerable to the variations in interest 
rates on the international markets. 
From a distributive viewpoint, the effect of 
the rise in the international nominal interest 
rates should be related to the evolution of those 
particular prices which are significant for na-
tional private borrowers. For them, the relevant 
prices are given by the changes in domestic 
prices in relation to the changes in the exchange 
rate. From this comparison, it will be seen that 
the effect of the rise in nominal interest rates 
has not in general been passed on to the na-
tional private borrowers, since most of the coun-
tries in the region exhibit either a fixed ex-
change rate with increases in domestic prices, or 
exchange-rate depreciation lagging behind 
domestic inflation. 
Clear example of fixed exchange rates 
with domestic inflation are provided by the oil-
exporting countries, especially Mexico and Ven-
ezuela, together with small and open economies 
such as Honduras, which also maintained a 
fixed exchange rate against upward variations 
in domestic prices. From the standpoint of those 
who incur debts in dollars, this results in a nega-
tive real interest rate. The same has occurred in 
Argentina and Chile, since both countries ap-
plied during this period stabilization policies 
which made use either of a fixed exchange rate 
or lagging devaluation as instruments for reduc-
ing inflationary pressures. In these two cases, 
the real interest rate for dollar debtors is also 
negative. In Brazil and Colombia, where lags in 
foreign-exchange-rate depreciation are also 
found, but to a lesser degree than in the coun-
tries mentioned before, the effect was to reduce 
the increase in the real interest rate by about a 
half in Brazil and by one ninth in Colombia. 
Lastly, there are countries such as Costa Rica, 
where the rise in nominal interest rates has been 
combined with an appreciation in real terms of 
the exchange rate, this resulting in a positive 
real interest rate that is higher for the private 
debtor than for the country as a whole. 
In sum, it is clear that the rise which has re-
cently occurred in international nominal inter-
est rates amounts to an additional substantial 
burden for the countries of the region, which at 
the same time are being forced to adjust their 
economies to a recessive situation. Nevertheless, 
on analysing the effect of the rise of interest 
rates in real terms, the situations of particular 
countries are found to differ according to the 
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evolution of their export prices, the weight of 
the debt in relation to the national product, and 
the proportion of the debt subject to variable in-
terest rates. Finally, the actual incidence of the 
increase in nominal interest rates upon the na-
tional private sector depends on the exchange 
policy applied in each country and on the evolu-
tion of domestic prices, the result being in most 
cases a lesser burden than that determined by 
the variation in the interest rate in the interna-
tional financial markets, while in some countries 
this has even been transformed from a burden 
into a subsidy. 
IV 
The economic adjustment and the labour market 
It is increasingly argued that higher real wages 
are one of the principal factors behind the 
growth of open unemployment. This line of ar-
gument, whose theoretical basis is highly ques-
tionable in view of the assumptions put forward 
to justify it, is not borne out by the existing data. 
On analysing the variation in wages 
(whether the urban minimum, those in man-
ufacturing industry or in construction) in rela-
tion to the changes in open unemployment dur-
ing two sub-periods of the past decade, the re-
sults clearly show that no such relationship 
exists. The information on 12 Latin American 
countries for the periods 1975-1978 and 1978-
1981, selected because of the different interna-
tional situation prevailing in each one, clearly 
confirms this assertion (see table 3). 
Thus, during the first period only in one 
country (Venezuela) was the fall in urban mini-
mum wages accompanied by a significant de-
crease in the rate of open unemployment. Even 
in this case, however, this relationship no longer 
holds good in connection with the change in in-
dustrial wages. Moreover, there is no country 
where an increase in real wages is seen to be as-
sociated with a significant rise (oyer one percent-
age point) in open unemployment. On the con-
trary, in 6 out of the 12 countries considered we 
find the opposite association, that is to say in-
creases in real wages accompanied by significant 
decreases in the rate of open unemployment 
rate or decreases in the former together with a 
significant rise in open unemployment. 
In the period 1978-1981 only two coun-
tries show a simultaneous fall in real wages and 
in open unemployment when both urban mini-
mum wages and industrial wages are consid-
ered. Similarly, if we analyse movements in the 
same direction (i.e., increases in real wages to-
gether with increases in open unemployment) 
the number of cases observed is three for the 
urban minimum wage, but there is no signifi-
cant case in relation to wages in industry and 
construction. In contrast, there is a greater 
number of countries showing opposite move-
ments in real wages and the rate of open un-
employment, whatever the type of wage consid-
ered. 
This scanty relation between changes in 
the real wage and changes in open unemploy-
ment, and indeed the observation of consider-
able evidence to the contrary, points to the need 
to investigate the likelihood of other determi-
nant factors. In particular, changes in the level of 
economic activity can induce variations in the 
open-unemployment rates. This statement is 
based not only on an important current of 
theoretical interpretation but also on the avail-
able evidence for short-term variations, which 
seems to suggest the existence of a high correla-
tion of this sort. On relating information on the 
growth of the gross domestic product with 
changes in the rate of open unemployment (see 
table 3), it is observed that in the period 1975-
1978, in 5 of the 12 countries for which infor-
mation is available there was a positive correla-
tion between accelerated growth and decreases 
in the unemployment rate, or between a con-
traction in the product and an increase in the 
unemployment rate. Again, in the period 1978-
1981, in 5 of the 12 countries considered this re-
lationship holds good. It is clear, then, that 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA A N D T H E CARIBBEAN: REAL WAGES ACTIVITY LEVELS 
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Source: PREALC figures on the basis of information from the countries. 
a
 Annual growth rates. 
b
 wm : urban minimum wages. 
w¡ : wages in manufacturing industry. 
wc : wages ¡n construction. Percentage variation during the period. 
1
 Changes, in percentage points, between the first and the last years. 
d
 Refersto 1978-1980. 
c
 Preliminary estimate. 
1
 Refers to total wages. 
« Refersto 1978-1979. 
there is in the short run an appreciable degree 
of correlation between the level of economic ac-
tivity and the rate of open unemployment, 
though in some cases a high growth rate is as-
sociated with a constant unemployment rate. 
The preceding analysis consequently 
suggests that the open-unemployment rate ap-
pears to be more responsive to changes in the 
activity level than to variations in real wages. 
However, the possibility of explaining changes 
in the labour market through the mere observa-
tion of variations in open unemployment is in-
deed limited for economies like those of the re-
gion, where there is a significant amount of un-
deremployment. Adjustment in heterogeneous 
labour markets may take various forms: changes 
in open unemployment, variations in under-
employment or a combination of both. Let us il-
lustrate the reaction of the labour market to a 
recessive conjunction by looking at four Latin 
American countries presenting different condi-
tions. 
For this purpose, we chose Argentina in 
the period 1974-1980, Chile during the past de-
cade, and Venezuela and Costa Rica as from 
1978. The first two cases were selected because 
they combine external adjustment with pro-
found changes in economic policy, mainly di-
rected towards achieving price stabilization and 
a higher degree of openness. The third case il-
lustrates the experience of an oil-exporting 
country combining an oil boom with economic 
policies aimed at correcting some internal dis-
equilibria mainly reflected in an upsurge of in-
flation compared with previous historial pat-
terns. The last country illustrates the case of a 
small open economy facing balance-of-pay-
ments problems and inflationary pressures. 
As may be seen from table 4, the four cases 
present common features. On the one hand, the 
rate of growth of the product is low, and even 
negative in Venezuela. On the other hand, all 
these economies exhibit inflationary problems, 
though in differing degrees. In Costa Rica and 
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Table 4 
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c
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Venezuela, although the price increases might 
be considered relatively moderate, the annual 
rates registered were four and even five times as 
high as the historic inflation rate. Finally, dur-
ing the periods under analysis, real wages are 
seen to decline in all four cases. These common 
features reflect in fact similar economic policy 
decisions designed to control domestic demand 
and wages with a view to reducing price in-
creases.6 
However, the labour market reacted quite 
differently in each case. In Argentina, the ad-
justment took place via an increase in the prop-
ortion of those employed in the urban informal 
sector, while the open-unemployment rate re-
mained virtually constant throughout the 
period. In Chile and Costa Rica, on the con-
trary, the adjustment proceeded almost entirely 
through a rise in the open-unemployment rate, 
while the proportion of the urban informal sec-
6 I t should be noted that the capacity of changes in 
real wages and in the level of activity to provide useful ex-
planations when analysing variations in open unemploy-
ment is extremely limited, and indeed they often give con-
tradictory answers. Thus, although real wages went down in 
all four cases, the rate of unemployment remained un-
changed or went up in all cases. 
tor remained constant. The labour market in 
Venezuela, for its part, adjusted in an inter-
mediate manner, snowing a rise both in the 
open-unemployment rate and in the proportion 
of those employed in the urban informal sector. 
The first of these cases illustrates an adjustment 
entirely achieved by way of an increase in under-
employment; in Chile and Costa Rica there was 
an increase in open unemployment; and in Ven-
ezuela the adjustment operated through both 
open unemployment and underemployment. 
At this point, one might ask what it is that 
determines these distinctly different types of ad-
justment in the labour market. Given the simi-
larity between the four countries under analysis 
in respect of the magnitude of the informal sec-
tor, the difference might be traced to the aver-
age level of income prevailing in this sector. 
Both in Argentina and in Venezuela, the aver-
age income obtained by informal workers is only 
slightly different from that corresponding to oc-
cupations in modern activities. In Chile and 
Costa Rica, however, the difference is as high as 
30%. This seems to imply that those who are un-
able to find work in the modern sector because 
of the adjustment in the labour market prefer to 
remain in active search for a job when the other 
employment opportunities open to them would 
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entail a considerably smaller income. In con-
trast, when the difference is not so marked the 
option of working in the informal sector until 
the labour market becomes normal appears a 
valid alternative. 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the ad-
justment of the labour market in developing 
countries like those analysed above with a de-
veloped country, say, the United States during 
the same period. For this country, the data show 
that the non-agricultural population grew by 
2.8% per year between 1978 and 1981, the 
number of unemployed rose by 10.5% per year, 
and the non-professional self-employed and 
unpaid family workers diminished by 6.3% per 
year. It is clearly a case of adjustment through 
increases in the open unemployment rate. Since 
income differentials in the United States are 
small, or at any rate smaller than in Argentina 
and Venezuela, one would have a prion ex-
pected also an expansion of non-wage occupa-
tions, but the real difference lies in the existence 
of an unemployment insurance which in the 
United States covers more than 40% of the un-
employed. For these people, unemployment 
does not mean zero income, since they receive a 
guaranteed income while actively searching for 
new jobs. 
Apart from illustrating differences in 
types of adjustment of the labour market, the 
comparative analysis made above suggests that 
the distributive effects in each case are differ-
ent. Thus, the existence of unemployment in-
surance with wide coverage at normal income 
levels minimizes the direct effect on the distri-
bution of income. At the other extreme, an in-
crease in the number of unemployed without 
any welfare aid, as in Chile and Costa Rica, leads 
to a drastic deterioration in the distribution, 
while the intermediate cases of adjustment 
through expansion of less remunerated occupa-
tions also affect negatively the distribution of in-
come, albeit in a milder way. In this latter case, 
the reduction of the average income of the self-
employed plays the role of a collective un-
employment insurance, constituting in practice 
a second-best solution from a welfare point of 
view. 
